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Abstract 
 
The likelihood ratio (LR) is a probabilistic method that has been championed as a ‘simple 
rule’ for evaluating the probative value of forensic evidence in court. Intuitively, if the LR is 
greater than one then the evidence supports the prosecution hypothesis; if the LR is less than 
one it supports the defence hypothesis, and if the LR is equal to one then the evidence favours 
neither (and so is considered 'neutral' - having no probative value). It can be shown by Bayes’ 
theorem that this simple relationship only applies to pairs of hypotheses for which one is the 
negation of the other (i.e. to mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses) and is not 
applicable otherwise. We show how easy it can be - even for evidence experts - to use pairs of 
hypotheses that they assume are mutually exclusive and exhaustive but are not, and hence to 
arrive at erroneous conclusions about the value of evidence using the LR.  Furthermore, even 
when mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses are used there are extreme restrictions as 
to what can be concluded about the probative value of evidence just from a LR.  Most 
importantly, while the distinction between source-level hypotheses (such as defendant 
was/was not at the crime scene) and offence-level hypotheses (defendant is/is not guilty) is 
well known, it is not widely understood that a LR for evidence about the former generally has 
no bearing on the LR of the latter. We show for the first time (using Bayesian networks) the 
full impact of this problem, and conclude that it is only the LR of the offence level hypotheses 
that genuinely determine the probabitive value of the evidence. We investigate common 
scenarios in which evidence has a LR of one but still has significant probative value (i.e. is 
not neutral as is commonly assumed). As illustration we consider the ramifications of these 
points for the case of Barry George. The successful appeal against his conviction for the 
murder of Jill Dando was based primarily on the argument that the firearm discharge residue 
(FDR) evidence, assumed to support the prosecution hypothesis at the original trial, actually 
had an LR equal to one and hence was ‘neutral’.  However, our review of the appeal transcript 
shows numerous examples of the problems with the use of hypotheses identified above. We 
show that if one were to follow the arguments recorded in the Appeal judgment verbatim, 
then contrary to the Appeal conclusion, the probative value of the FDR evidence may not 
have been neutral as was concluded.  
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1. Introduction 
 
One way to determine the probative value of any piece of evidence E (such as a 
footprint matching that of the defendant found at the crime scene) is to use the 
likelihood ratio (LR) [22] [3]. This is the probability of E given the prosecution 
hypothesis (e.g., ‘defendant guilty') divided by the probability of E given the 
alternative, complementary defence hypothesis (e.g, ‘defendant not guilty’). 
Increasingly, it is recommended as a ‘simple rule’ for evaluating forensic evidence in 
courts [13][10][25][31]. Broader questions about how well the LR can capture the 
legal concept of relevance are discussed in [27][28][29]. 
 
Because the LR involves probabilities – and ultimately some understanding of Bayes’ 
theorem – its actual use in courts is often controversial, as can be seen from the RvT 
judgement [2], which seemed to suggest that it should only be applicable to evidence 
(such as DNA) where the relevant probabilities are based on extensive databases of 
evidence. Numerous papers have criticized the RvT judgement, highlighting its 
misunderstandings not just about the LR but about the about the role of probabilistic 
inference in the law generally [8][25][32][34]. It is not the intention of this paper to 
revisit these arguments. In fact, for simplicity, we will assume that there is no 
disagreement about the specific probability values used in a given LR (the potential 
for such disagreement was the focus of the RvT debate and does not need to be 
repeated). Rather, we focus on a much more fundamental concern about the LR, 
namely the circumstances under which it actually provides correct information about 
the probative value of the evidence. We believe this is the first paper to identify these 
concerns in full.  
This paper argues that there are many circumstances in which the actual probative 
value of evidence may be very different from what can be concluded from the LR. 
This includes the fact that, contrary to received opinion, evidence with a LR equal to 
one can often still have significant probative value, i.e. is not neutral. Similarly, 
evidence  with LR > 1, may actually have greater probative value on the prosecution 
hypothesis than on the defence hypothesis (and conversely an LR < 1 can be of 
greater probative value on the defence hypothesis than on the prosecution hypothesis).   
This is because there are several significant subtleties to consider when interpreting 
LRs. Consideration of these subtleties requires careful, precise definitions of the 
hypotheses and the evidence being evaluated. We will show that, to interpret the LR 
as a meaningful measure of probative value of evidence (as opposed to a comparison 
between hypotheses), requires consideration of only pairs of hypotheses that are both 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive, which means that exactly one of the hypotheses 
must be true. This point (together with the fact that we cannot sidestep the need to 
consider prior probabilities when considering the LR) has been considered by others 
in the research community (see [26][7][12][37][24]). However, in practice, these 
concerns do not seem to have been well understood, and we will show that even the 
most senior evidence experts have encountered difficulty in formulating relevant 
hypotheses that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Second, even when 
hypotheses are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, there remains the potential during 
a case to confuse what in [11] were referred to as source-level hypotheses (such as 
blood at the scene belonging to or not belonging to the defendant) and offence-level 
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hypotheses
2
 (such as defendant being guilty or not guilty). Sometimes one may mutate 
into another through slight changes in the precision with which they are expressed. A 
LR for the source-level hypotheses will not in general be the same as for the offence-
level hypotheses. Indeed, we will show it is possible that an LR that strongly favours 
one side for the source-level hypotheses can actually strongly favour the other side for 
the offence-level hypotheses even though both pairs of hypotheses seem very similar. 
Similarly, an LR that is neutral under the source-level hypotheses may actually be 
significantly non-neutral under the associated offence-level hypotheses.  
To illustrate the issues we raise, we use the Barry George Appeal judgment [1] in 
which the use of LR gained widespread attention because of it central role.  We 
believe there are examples of many of the above problems in the transcript. Barry 
George had previously been convicted of the murder of TV celebrity Jill Dando. In 
the Appeal it was argued that the Firearm Discharge Residue (FDR) evidence, that 
had formed a key component of the prosecution case at the original trial, actually had 
a LR equal to one. The defence argued that this meant that the evidence was ‘neutral’ 
i.e. it had no probative value. The Judge duly quashed the original conviction as 
unsafe. Our critique of the Barry George appeal case is aimed towards the judgment 
transcript and not the actual expert testimonies during the trial. We have good reason 
to believe that careful testimonies may have been inaccurately presented in the appeal 
judgment. The extent of the confusion and mistaken reasoning present in the judgment 
document shows that these issues regarding the interpretation of the LR remain 
widely misunderstood. 
 
In Section 2 we provide an overview of the role of likelihoods and the definiton of 
LR. We explain exactly what is meant by probative value of evidence and why the 
LR may be used to evaluate this. We also explain precisely what is meant by ‘neutral’ 
evidence. Our presentation clears up a number of widely held misunderstandings. In 
particular, we show why Bayes’ theorem is critical and that the use of prior 
probabilities for hypotheses cannot be side stepped (many texts assume that the LR 
can be understood without either Bayes’ theorem or the consideration of priors). In 
Sections 3 and 4 we focus on the special case of evidence for which the LR is one. 
Withthe help of Bayesian networks we use scenarios to exemplify how, in many 
circumstances, a LR of one does not ensure neutral evidence. Specifically, in Section 
3, we show examples where the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. In Section 4 we show that, even when evidence has a LR of one for 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses (thus, really is neutral with respect to 
those hypotheses), the evidence has probative value. This means it  is not neutral with 
regard to other relevant hypotheses; this includes  the  offence-level hypotheses of 
whether or not the  defendant is guilty. Section 5 provides a thorough analysis of the 
Barry George appeal case judgment and shows how this document contains many 
examples of hypotheses used for the FDR evidence that were potentially not mutually 
exclusive and were not properly linked to the offence-level hypotheses. We 
demonstrate that if one were to follow the arguments recorded in the Appeal judgment 
verbatim, the probative value of the FDR evidence may not have been neutral 
(contrary to the Appeal conclusion) bur rather still supported the prosecution.  
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Some of what appears in Sections 2-4 is known to probability experts and a small 
number of forensic experts, but the ramifications do not appear to have been made 
explicit anywhere, nor have there been appropriate examples demonstrating the 
problems. This is the first paper to reveal the full extent of the problems. We use the 
formalism of Bayesian networks [17][36] both to model explicitly the causal 
relationships between hypotheses and evidence and also to automatically compute the 
necessary probability calculations. However, to ensure as wide a readership as 
possible most of the necessary calculations and detailed model descriptions appear 
only in the supplementary material  [38]. The models themselves (which can be run in 
the free version of the sotware tool [3]) are all provided in supplementary material 
[39]. 
 
 
2. Likelihoods, the likelihood ratio and the probative 
value of evidence 
 
Any legal trial seeks to determine whether one or more hypothesis is either true or 
false.  In the simplest case the prosecution has a single hypothesis Hp (defendant 
guilty) and the defence has a single alternative hypothesis Hd (defendant innocent).  In 
this simplest case we assume that Hd is the same as “not Hp” (formally this means that 
Hp and Hd are mutually exclusive and exhaustive events).  
 
Belief in a hypothesis is expressed as a probability. The prior probability of a 
hypothesis Hp, written P(Hp), is the probability of Hp before we observe any evidence. 
When there are two mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses, Hp and Hd, the 
greater our belief in one, the less our belief in the other since P(Hd) = 1-P(Hp) by a 
basic axiom of probability. When we observe evidence E we revise our belief in Hp 
(and similarly Hd). This revised probability is called the posterior probability of Hp 
and is written P(Hp | E) which means the ‘probability of Hp given E’.  Bayes’ theorem 
(see Appendix 1) provides a formula for computing this posterior probability. If the 
posterior probability is greater than the prior probability then it makes sense to say 
that the evidence E supports the hypothesis Hp, because our belief in Hp has increased 
after observing E.  And if our belief in Hp has increased then our belief in Hd must 
have decreased since they are mutually exclusive explanations for the evidence, E.  
So, in such situations, it is both natural and correct to say that the evidence supports 
Hp over Hd. The bigger the increase the more the evidence E supports Hp over Hd.  
 
Because many lawyers assume that prior probabilities are for jury members only (as 
they are ‘personal and subjective’) it is widely assumed that they should not be 
considered in court by forensic experts [17]).  Instead, a comparison of the probability 
of evidence E being found under both of the hypotheses is used to capture the 
probative value of evidence.  Specifically, we compare  
 
 The probability of E assuming Hp is true - this is written P(E | Hp) and is called 
the prosecution likelihood  
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 The probability of E assuming Hd is true - this is written P(E | Hd) and is called 
the defence likelihood
3
 
 
and calculate the likelihood ratio (LR)
4
, which is the prosecution likelihood divided 
by the defence likelihood.  
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A simple example of how the LR describes the impact of evidence on hypotheses is 
shown in Appendix 1. We also prove in Appendix 1 that when prosecution and 
defence hypotheses are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, a LR of greater than one 
supports the prosecution hypothesis and a LR of less than one supports the defence 
hypothesis.  Hence, the LR has a simple interpretation for the probative value of the 
evidence under these assumptions.  
 
The proof of the probative value of evidence in terms of the LR depends on Bayes’ 
theorem. Typically textbooks ‘prove’ the simple LR rule by comparing the prior odds 
(of the prosecution hypothesis against the defence hypothesis) with the posterior odds. 
This ‘odds’ approach (which is also explained in Appendix 1) is considered a ‘simple 
rule’ because it demands only that we consider relative probabilities of alternative 
hypotheses rather than additionally focus on the prior probabilities of one or other 
hypothesis. However, we believe that this rule is confusing. Not only does it hide the 
assumption that the hypotheses need to be mutually exclusive for it to be correct, but 
it also fails to tell us clearly what we most need to know: namely, that for the 
evidence E to ‘support’ the hypothesis Hp it is necessary that the posterior probability 
of Hp, i.e. P(Hp | E), is greater than the prior probability P(Hp): in other words our 
belief in Hp being true increases after we observe E.  
 
This also leads us to a natural and rigorous definition of ‘neutral’ evidence. 
Specifically, the evidence E is neutral for Hp if the posterior is unchanged from the 
prior after observing the evidence, i.e. P(Hp | E) = P(Hp). Appendix 2 provides a 
mathematical proof that, when Hp and Hd are mutually exclusive and exhaustive and 
the LR equals one, then the evidence is neutral for Hp and must also be neutral for Hd 
and vice versa. However, Appendix 2 also proves that when Hp and Hd are not 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive, all we can actually conclude when the LR is equal 
to one is that the ratio of the posterior probabilities of Hp and Hd is equal to the ratio 
of the prior probabilities. In Section 3 we will show examples where the evidence in 
such cases is not neutral with respect to Hp and Hd.  First, however, there are two 
fundamental, points that must be noted about the limitations of the use of the LR that 
are not widely understood: 
 
                                                 
3
 Other researchers have correctly pointed out the difficulties in defining the impact of evidence on a 
single defence hypothesis Hd because in actuality Hd is often made up of multiple hypotheses that are 
difficult to articulate and quantify [7]. This has been described in detail for DNA evidence [26]. 
However, for our purposes we will assume that P(E| Hd) can be meaningfully computed. 
4
 It is argued that one of the most important benefits of the LR is that it forces experts to consider both 
the prosecution and defence likelihoods.  Hence it helps avoid well-known problems associated with 
focusing on a single likelihood, such as interpreting a low defence likelihood as synonymous with a 
low probability of Hd being true, or even worse committing the prosecutor’s fallacy [17] . 
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The ‘prior misconception’: the LR is popular with forensic experts precisely because 
it can be calculated without having to consider any prior probabilities for the 
hypotheses  [30]. But this is something of a misconception for two reasons. First, the 
LR actually tells us nothing about the probability that either hypothesis is true, no 
matter how high or low it is. We can only make conclusions about such (posterior) 
probabilities if we know the prior probabilities. Although this observation has been 
well documented [16][23]   this issue continues to confound not just lawyers, but also 
forensic experts and statisticians. An indication of the extent of the confusion can be 
found in one of the many responses by the latter community to the RvT judgement. 
Specifically, in the otherwise excellent position statement [5] (signed by multiple 
experts) is the extraordinary point 9 that asserts: 
 
“It is regrettable that the judgment confuses the Bayesian approach with the 
use of Bayes' Theorem. The Bayesian approach does not necessarily involve 
the use of Bayes' Theorem.” 
 
By the “Bayesian approach” the authors are specifically referring to the use of the LR, 
thereby implying that the use of the LR is appropriate, while the use of Bayes’ 
Theorem may not be.  
 
The second reason why it is a misconception is because it is impossible to define  P(E 
| Hp) and P(E | Hd) meaningfully without knowing something about the priors P(Hp), 
P(Hd) (in strict Bayes’ terms
5
 we say the likelihoods and the priors are all conditioned 
on some background knowledge K). For example, suppose the evidence E in a 
murder case is: “DNA matching the defendant is found on victim”. While the 
prosecution likelihood P(E | Hp) might be agreed to be close to one,  there is a 
problem with the defence likelihood, P(E | Hd).  For DNA evidence such as this, the 
defence likelihood is usually assumed to be the random match probability (RMP) of 
the DNA type. This can typically be as low as one in a billion. But consider two 
extreme values that may be considered appropriate for the prior P(Hp), derived from 
different scenarios used to determine K :  
 
a) P(Hp) = 0.5, where the defendant is one of two people seen grappling with the 
victim before one of them killed the victim; 
b) P(Hp) = 1/40 million.where nothing is known about the defendant other than 
he is one of 40 million adults in the UK who could have potentially committed 
the crime.   
 
Whereas a value for P(E | Hd) = RMP seems reasonable in case b), it is clearly not in 
case a). In case a) the defendant’s DNA is very likely to be on the victim irrespective 
of whether or not he is guilty. This suggests a value of P(E | Hd)  close to 1. It follows 
that, without an understanding about the priors and the background knowledge, we 
can end up with vastly different LRs associated with the same hypotheses and 
evidence. 
 
                                                 
5
 Specifically, the priors P(Hp), P(Hd),  really refer to P(Hp|K) and P(Hd|K) respectively. The likelihoods 
must take account of the same background knowledge K that is implicit in these priors.  So the ‘real’ 
likelihoods we need are P(E|Hp, K) and P(E|Hd, K). 
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The simple evidence misconception.  In many cases the evidence E actually comprises 
multiple separate pieces of evidence, and it is only when the likelihoods of these 
separate pieces of evidence are considered that correct conclusions about probative 
value of the evidence can be made. Consider the following example E: “tiny matching 
DNA trace found”. Suppose that the DNA trace has a profile with a random match 
probability of 1/100 (such relatively ‘high’ match probabilities are common in low-
template samples [6]). It would be typical to assume that P(E | Hp) = 1 and that P(E | 
Hd) = 1/100 leading to a LR of 100, thus indicating quite strong support for the 
prosecution hypothesis. However, the evidence E actually comprises two separate 
pieces of evidence: 
 
 E1: tiny DNA trace found 
 E2: DNA trace found matches defendant 
 
In particular, this makes clear the relevance of finding only a tiny trace of DNA when 
larger amounts would be expected to have been left by the person who committed the 
crime. So, actually P(E | Hp) will be much smaller than 1, because we would expect 
substantial amounts of DNA to be found, rather than just a tiny trace. To elicit all the 
necessary individual likelihood values, and to carry out the correct Bayesian 
calculations needed for the overall LR in situations such as this, we actually need the 
formalism of Bayesian networks [20][21][36] and its supporting tools [19], as 
explained in Appendix 3. In fact Appendix 3 describes the two components of the 
Bayesian network (BN) method that we use throughout this work: 
 
(i) A method for defining the nodes of the BN in such a way as to carefully 
distinguish between those hypotheses that are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive and those that are not. This ensures that experts are only ever 
required to consider pairs of mutually exclusive hypotheses when 
specifying likelihoods. 
(ii) Modelling the causal story between hypotheses and different pieces of 
evidence. 
 
Appendix 3 shows how to model the separate pieces of evidence E1 and E2 (in the 
above example) and their relationship to Hp and Hd in a BN. The resulting calculations 
confirm that, under a set of very reasonable assumptions, the LR is less than one. 
Hence, the evidence actually supports the defence hypothesis Hd rather than Hp.   
.  
3. The problems when hypotheses are not mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive  
 
When the assumption of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses is either 
wittingly or unwittingly undermined, the relationship between the LR and the notion 
of ‘probative value’ of the evidence can change dramatically. 
3.1 Hypotheses that are not mutually exclusive 
 
If Hp and Hd are not mutually exclusive then Hp and Hd could both be true.  
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Example 1: Suppose a defendant is charged with murder and that: 
 
Hp is “defendant guilty” and  
Hd is “defendant not at the crime scene”  
 
Then Hp and Hd may both be true (as would be the case if the defendant paid a 
hired killer). It is also the case that neither may be true. Suppose the priors for 
Hp and Hd are both 0.5. Now suppose we get the following evidence E 
 
E: Ten minutes before the crime took place the defendant – seen at a 
different location - was overheard on the phone saying ‘go ahead and 
kill him’.  
 
The evidence E clearly supports both hypotheses, and it is quite conceivable that both 
P(E | Hp) and P(E | Hd) are equal. In supplement [38] Section 1 we provide the details 
of a situation in which both are equal to 0.9 and so the LR equals one. The supplement 
[38]  also shows that P(Hp | E) = P(Hd | E) = 0.666 in this case. So the ratio of the 
posterior probabilities has remained the same as the ratio of the prior probabilities but 
the probability of both hypotheses have increased from 0.5 to 0.666. Because of the 
nature of the hypotheses, the fact that the probability of guilt has increased, even 
though the defence hypothesis has increased by a similar amount, means that the 
evidence E has genuine probative value despite its LR being equal to one. In this case 
we are not only more confident of guilt, but we are also more confident that the 
suspect was not at the crime scene. In other words, the increase in the probability of 
the defence hypothesis does not necessarily increase belief in innocence, but rather 
provides an explanation for guilt. 
 
In the case where there is separate evidence E, such as a murder motive, to support Hp 
the probative value of the supposedly ‘neutral’ evidence E can become even more 
dramatic as is shown in supplement [38] .  
 
If readers feel that Example 1 is unsatisfactory because the likelihood values were 
‘plucked out of the air’ then the following  example demonstrates the same core point 
for likelihoods that are indisputable: 
 
Example 2: The defendant rolls two dice – a black die which he owns and a 
red die randomly selected by a member of the public from a batch provided by 
a reputable dice company. The evidence E against the defendant is that both 
dice rolls are 6s. However, in this case the prosecution hypothesis Hp concerns 
only the black die, while the defence hypothesis Hd concerns only the red die: 
 
Hp: “The black die is fixed with all sides being 6s”  
Hd: “The red die is fixed with all sides being 6s” 
 
The reason Hd is the defence hypotheses is because it was subsequently discovered 
that the red die came from a batch in which 50% were faulty in the sense of having all 
sides sixes. Hence, the prior P(Hd) = 1/2. Suppose the prior P(Hp) = 1/2 because it is 
known that 50% of the defendant’s black dice are fixed with all sides being 6s. In 
supplement [38] Section 2 we prove that P(E | Hp) = P(E | Hd) = 7/12, so the LR is 1. 
But the evidence is not neutral. We show that the posterior probability of Hp  is  6/7 
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and so the prosecution hypothesis is now very likely. Just because the defence 
hypothesis has increased by the same amount as the prosecution hypothesis, is 
essentially irrelevant.    
 
We also use a slight variation of the dice example to show in supplement [38] Section 
3 that it is possible to have an LR of less than 0.5 even though the evidence favors the 
prosecution hypothesis rather than the defence. The variation is to assume that 10%, 
rather than 50%, of the red dice were faulty. In this case  P(E | Hd) = 7/12 as before. 
However, P( E | Hp) = ¼ meaning the LR is 0.43. According to the guidelines on the 
LR in [30] we should be able to conclude that the evidence provides support for the 
defence hypothesis. But this is nonsense because what matters is that, as before, P(Hp 
| E) = 6/7. 
 
A further problem introduced by non-mutual exclusivity is that likelihoods are apt to 
be incorrectly reported. This is because the following probabilities are no longer all 
the same:  
 
P(E | Hp)  
P(E | not Hd) 
P(E | Hp and not Hd)  
 
If an expert fails to understand that Hp and Hd are not mutually exclusive it is likely 
that when asked to give the likelihoods for P(E | Hp) and P(E | Hd) they will provide 
instead P(E | Hp and not Hd) and P(E | Hd and not Hp), which are not equal to P(E | Hp) 
and P(E | Hd).  In this circumstance, it is possible that the likelihoods provided by the 
expert are equal, i.e.  P(E | Hp and not Hd) = P(E | Hd and not Hp) when the true 
likelihoods, P(E | Hp) and P(E | Hd), are not equal at all. Supplement [38] Section 4 
demonstrates exactly such a scenario using the same dice example. This shows how it 
is easy to be deceived into thinking evidence might have a LR of one when it does 
not.   
3.2 Hypotheses exclusive but non-exhaustive  
If Hp and Hd are exclusive but not exhaustive then although they cannot both be true, 
it is possible that neither may be true.  
 
Example 3: Fred and Bill attempt to rob a man. When the man resists he is 
struck on the head and dies. During the long police investigation Bill dies 
while on remand so Fred is tried on his own for murder. Fred's defence is that 
it was Bill and not him who struck the blow to the head.  Hence we have: 
 
 
Hp is “Fred struck fatal blow”  
Hd is “Bill struck fatal blow”  
 
Although these hypotheses are mutually exclusive they are not exhaustive since they 
fail to consider the possibility Ha that the man did not actually die from the blow to 
the head. Suppose we know that 10% of people who die while being physically 
assaulted actually die from a heart attack induced by the stress (hypothesis Ha). Then 
it is reasonable to assume that the priors for Hp and Hd are both 0.45 and the prior for 
Ha is 0.1. Now suppose we discover the following evidence E: 
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E: The dead man is known to have had a heart attack six months before 
the assault.  
 
It is clear in this case that P(E | Hp) = P(E | Hd) and hence the LR is 1 with respect to 
the hypotheses for Hp and Hd. However, it is also clear that, whatever the value is for 
P(E | Hp) and P(E | Hd), the value for P(E | Ha) is much higher. The effect of this is 
that, after observing E, the posterior probabilities of both Hp and Hd reduce (albeit by 
the same amount). In particular, P(Hp) drops after observing E. So, even though its LR 
is equal to one the evidence has clear probative value. 
 
Supplement [38] Section 5 shows that if P(E | Hp) and P(E | Hd) equal 0.01 and  P(E | 
Ha) is 0.5, then the posterior probability of Hp drops from 0.45 to 0.07627. 
 
3.3 Ensuring hypotheses are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive can be extremely difficult 
 
It follows from the above that, in order to use the LR to determine the probative value 
of evidence, the need to select hypotheses that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive  
is paramount.  In practice (we will show this more extensively in Section 5) it is easy 
to veer towards pairs of hypotheses that are not mutually exclusive and exhaustive. To 
give an indication of the extent of this problem we refer to the paper [28] which 
includes an extensive discussion between leading evidence experts about the LR.  
 
On page 8 of [28] Allen introduces an example where, for a pair of 
prosecution/defence hypotheses he shows that a piece of evidence has LR equal to 
one, but he claims the evidence is clearly probative (favours the prosecution) and 
admissible. He finds this paradox puzzling and feels it exposes some problems with 
the LR and Bayesian reasoning. Various experts (including those who write 
extensively about Bayes' theorem) subsequently weigh into the debate with complex 
philosophical arguments and explanations, and reasons why Bayes and the LR cannot 
be used etc. But not one of them identifies that Allen's example is fundamentally 
flawed because it is based on a pair of hypotheses that are neither mutually exclusive 
nor exhaustive
6
.  Allen's example is of a defendant accused of murder committed in a 
small town. The evidence E is that the defendant was seen driving to town shortly 
before the murder was committed. The 'prosecution' and 'defence' hypotheses are 
respectively: 
 
 Hp: "Defendant drove to town to commit murder" 
 Hd: "Defendant drove to town to visit his mother who lives there" 
 
These are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive because it is possible that both Hp 
and Hd could be true and also that both could be false. 
 
Hence, none of the evidence experts in [28]  appears to have grasped the implications 
explained in Sections 3.1 and 3.2: That unless the hypotheses are mutually exclusive 
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 In [29]Picinali discusses the example further and implicitly addresses some of the concerns we raise 
here. 
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and exhaustive the LR may tell us nothing about the probative value of the evidence 
and that an LR of one certainly does not mean 'no probative value'.  All that was 
needed was for someone to point out to Allen that - by the most simple application of 
Bayes theorem - an LR of one did not mean in this case that the evidence was not 
probative. End of discussion. We highlight this case to point out how easy it is to 
make the mistakes we describe above:  If even the world's leading evidence experts 
can fail to notice non-mutually exclusive hypotheses, it is something the legal 
community must pay attention to. It cannot be dismissed as yet another 'obvious' or 
'trivial' fact because clearly it is easily overlooked. 
 
Allen's hypotheses mix up the evidence (“seen driving to town”) with the ultimate 
hypothesis (“committed murder”).  Careful use of the BN causal modelling method 
we describe in Appendix 3 would help to avoid this problem, much as it helped to 
disentangle separate pieces of evidence presented as a single piece of evidence. The 
only natural way to model it - and to show that Allen's example is not a paradox at all 
- is to use the causal model (this is an example of a Bayesian network) shown in 
Figure 1. Here we have a Boolean node "Committed murder"  (whose true and false 
states represent the offence level hypotheses), a separate Boolean node "Visited 
mother" (whose true and false states represent the source level hypotheses introduced 
by the defence) and a separate evidence node E  "seen driving to town".   
 
Figure 1. Model and prior probabilities for Allen example. The prior conditional probablities for 
E are shown in the table, where for example the entry 0.1 is the probability that E is true given 
that both ‘committed murder’ is false and ‘visited mother’ is false 
 
In the model, as priors we use Allen's assumption that: 
 
P(E | Murder) = P(E | visited mother)  
 
We set each of these to be equal to 0.7 although the exact values chosen do not affect 
the overall argument that follows) and for simplicity we assume ‘ignorant prior’ 
assumptions for the two pairs of hypotheses (this choice also does not affect the 
following argument.  
 
Allen is wrong to conclude that the LR of the evidence with respect to the prosecution 
hypothesis is one. Instead of comparing P(E | Murder) to P(E | visited mother) as he 
does we have to compare it to P(E | not Murder).  
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In fact, while P(E | Murder) = 0.7, it turns out that P(E | not Murder) = 0.4 so the LR 
is not one but rather favours the prosecution hypothesis of ‘Murder’ being true. 
 
When we perfom the calculations for this model after observing E (i.e. E is set to 
‘true’) we get the result shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Updated probabilities after observing evidence E 
 
So Allen is correct in his intuition that E supports the prosecution hypothesis because   
P(Murder | E) is greater than P(Murder). The fact that it ALSO supports the defence 
hypothesis (with the same increase in probability) simply confirms what is written in 
Section 3.1 above (i.e. it is a consequence of non mutually exclusive hypotheses). 
 
The only way to really avoid Allen’s supposed paradox without introducing more than 
a single pair of hypotheses is to have very explicit hypotheses that are genuinely 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses, namely: 
 
Hp: "(defendant committed murder) AND (defendant did not visit mother)" 
 
not Hp: "(defendant did not commit murder) OR (defendant visited mother)" 
 
By De Morgan's law those are negations of each other. 
 
But the problem with such unnatural hypotheses is that it no longer seems either 
reasonable or feasible to assert that P(E | H) = P(E | not H) in this case  (if it were  
then the evidence really would be neutral). 
 
4. The problem with neglecting the impact of evidence 
on offence-level hypotheses 
Even when the hypotheses are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, the LR of the 
evidence may tell us nothing about its probative value on other superficially similar 
hypotheses. This is especially concerning if the source-level hypotheses (for which 
the evidence is neutral) are confused with offence-level hypotheses (the defendant is 
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innocent/guilty). Such concerns have been raised by other researchers in previous 
work [23][12], but without any detailed elaboration. 
 
Hence, we next consider the case where we have mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
source-level hypotheses, and evidence that has a LR of one, but which still has 
probative value for the (very closely related but different) offence-level hypotheses 
(which are also mutually exclusive and exhaustive). 
 
Example 4: Suppose two men, Fred and Joe live at the same address. It is 
known that gun X is registered to that address, but the identity of the owner is 
not known. A man, Bob, is found murdered from a gun shot. Shortly after the 
murder the police find the following evidence E: there is a gun in Fred’s house 
with firearm discharge residue (FDR) that matched that from the crime scene. 
Fred is charged with the murder of Bob. The offence level hypotheses are: 
 
Hp:  Fred fired the shot that killed Bob  
Hd:  Fred did not fire the shot that killed Bob 
 
However, at the trial, instead of focusing on the offence-level hypotheses, the 
lawyers and experts focus on the question of who owned the gun, which they 
assume is directly related to the question of guilt. Specifically, they consider: 
 
H1p: Fred owned the gun that killed Bob 
H1d: Fred did not own the gun that killed Bob 
 
These source-level hypotheses are mutually exclusive and exhaustive and so 
there is no possibility of making any of the errors highlighted in Section 3.  
 
If we assume (as is reasonable) that the gun is equally likely to be owned by Fred or 
Joe, then it follows that the probability of the evidence E given H1p is the same as the 
probability of the evidence E given H1d. Hence, the LR of the evidence is one. A 
defence lawyer would therefore be correct in concluding that the evidence is neutral 
with respect to the hypotheses H1d and H1p. However, if he were to also conclude that 
“the evidence has no probative value as it supports neither the prosecution nor defence 
case” he would be wrong. The evidence is not neutral with respect to the offence-level 
hypotheses Hp and Hd. 
 
Again we use the modelling method proposed in Appendix 2 to arrive at the causal 
BN model shown in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3 Simple BN for example 3 
 
Using the following reasonable assumptions: 
 
 The prior probability of H1p and H1d are equal (both 1/2) 
 The probability of finding the evidence, E, is higher if Fred did fire the shot 
that killed Bob than if he did not fire the shot 
 Fred is just as likely to have fired the shot that killed Bob whether he owns the 
gun or not. We assume the probability in each case is 1/100 (so the prior 
probability of Hp is 1/100). 
 
We show in supplement [38] Section 6 that, while the posterior probability of the 
source-level prosecution hypothesis H1p remains unchanged after we enter the 
evidence E as true, the offence level prosecution hypothesis Hp changes from a prior 
of 1% to a posterior of 9.1%. Thus the evidence that was ‘neutral’ with respect to 
whether Fred owned the gun has real probative value towards the ultimate hypothesis 
of Fred’s guilt.   
 
It follows from the above discussion that the LR of any piece of evidence should be 
calculated against the offence level hypotheses. If (as is usual) the LR determined by 
forensic experts was calculated for source level hypotheses, then this will involve the 
kind of calculations that are automatically computed using an appropriate BN model 
and tool, but which are difficult and tiresome to calculate manually. 
 
There is one additional problem that leads to LRs that can easily be misunderstood:  in 
many situations even the offence level hypotheses "guilty or not guilty" may actually 
hide implict assumptions that suggest the hypotheses are not exhaustive (so that we 
are back in the situation described in Section 3.2). An example would be where there 
is an implict assumption that a crime has actually taken place (for example, a murder) 
even though there is a small probability (ignored by both sides) that the victim was 
not actually murdered. In such a situation the 'offence level' hypotheses Hp ("guilty") 
and Hd ("not guilty") may be wrongly assumed to be exhaustive because what they 
actually mean are, respectively, "murder was committed by the defendant" and 
"murder was committed by somebody other than the defendant".  What is missing is 
the hypothesis Hn "no crime committed". Supplement [38] Section 7 provides a 
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comprehensive example of this in which we have the evidence E: "victim left a 
suicide note". 
5. Implications for Barry George case 
The scenarios above show that great care must be taken when using the LR. In 
particular, a LR of one can still have significant probative value depending on the 
choice of hypotheses and the precise meaning of the evidence. This has implications 
for the high profile case of Barry George, which centred around a piece of evidence 
that was later dismissed for having no probative value because it had a LR of one. We 
first provide a brief overview of the case. We then explain how the transcripts from 
the judgment of the Case Appeal [1] show how discussions of LRs can easily drift 
into examples where the simple interpretation of the LR was ill-formed and confused. 
We emphasize that the confusions highlighted are based on the Case Appeal judgment 
text alone, and we do not make any claims about how these corresponded to the actual 
arguments made during the appeal trial. Indeed, it is impossible to know how many of 
the confusions we describe below can be attributed to actual confusions made during 
the appeal versus confusions during the writing of the judgment document.
7
  
 
Nevertheless, the muddled state of the Case Appeal judgment document itself is 
evidence that LR arguments are easily confused in such a way that simple 
interpretations of the LR are not warranted. In particular: the document shows 
hypotheses (for which likelihoods are reported) that are ill-defined, and appear to drift 
over the course of the case; the precise definition of the evidence associated with the 
likelihoods reported also appear to change over the course of the case; the relationship 
among the multiple hypotheses being considered, and their relationship to the ultimate 
hypotheses, are unclear; causal explanations are muddled with diagnostic reasoning, 
which may result in a confused interpretation of the statistics provided by expert 
witnesses. 
5.1 Summary of the Case and the Appeal 
 
In 2001 Barry George (BG) was convicted of the murder of TV celebrity Jill Dando 
(JD), who had been shot dead in 1999. An important part of the prosecution case 
centred on the following piece of evidence E: 
 
E: A single particle of firearm discharge residue (FDR) – which matched the 
constituent elements of FDR found at the crime scene – was found one year 
later in Barry George’s coat pocket.  
 
The prosecution expert witnesses (Mr Keeley and Dr Renshaw) asserted that it was 
not unusual for there to be just one particle found on the person firing the gun. The 
defence expert Dr Lloyd argued that the small size of the particle ‘cast doubts on 
where it came from’ — that it could be the result of contamination, including flawed 
police procedures. However, in  [1] we see that  
                                                 
7
 The actual judgments made in the case were almost certainly more sound than those recorded. For 
example, the transcript contains an example of the fallacy of the transposed conditional [17]. Paragraph 
18 of [1] claims that the testimony was made that:  "It was no more likely to have come from the gun 
that killed Miss Dando than from some extraneous source".  We understand from discussions with 
people involved in the case that this was certainly not stated in court. 
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… the main part of  his [Dr Lloyd’s] evidence was directed to the places where 
innocent contamination of [the coat] could have taken place. Dr Lloyd was of 
the view that the police procedures had been flawed and contamination could 
have occurred at any stage, even before the events surrounding the victim's 
death …” 
 
Consequently, analysis of the evidence had concentrated on the possibility that a 
particle would have got into the pocket as a result of indirect contamination on a 
number of identified occasions on which this might have occurred. The prosecution 
case had been that on each such occasion ‘this was so unlikely that it could be 
discounted’ [1]. Although no explicit probabilities were mentioned during the trial it 
is fair to conclude that this meant that there was a very low probability that the FDR 
in the coat pocket could have been caused by contamination.  
 
Barry George’s first appeal (on the basis of identification) in 2002 was unsuccessful. 
In the mean time Dr Ian Evett, who worked for the Forensic Science Service (FSS), 
became concerned about the way the FDR evidence was used. Evett is a pioneer of a 
technique called Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI) that stresses the need to 
consider both the prosecution and defence likelihoods for any piece of forensic 
evidence to determine its probative value [24][25]. Evett was concerned that only the 
defence likelihood had been discussed at the trial. In his view the evidence of a very 
low probability that the FDR in the coat pocket could have been caused by 
contamination was essentially a statement about the defence likelihood. Specifically, 
that P(E | Hd) was ‘very low’ where E is the FDR evidence and Hd is the defence 
hypothesis “BG did not fire the gun that shot JD”. 
 
Hence, Evett argued that P(E | Hd) had been presented to the jury without also 
presenting P(E | Hp), where Hp is the prosecution hypothesis “BG fired the gun that 
shot JD”. A low value for P(E | Hd), when presented in isolation, can easily be 
wrongly interpreted as implying a low value for P(Hd) – a problem that is exacerbated 
by the prosecutor’s fallacy [17].  Evett, therefore, asked Mr Keeley to provide 
probabilities for both P(E | Hd) and P(E | Hp). Keeley estimated that both P(E | Hd) 
and P(E | Hp) were equal to 1/100.  Since Hp and Hd are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive hypotheses it would follow correctly that the evidence had no probative 
value.  
 
Evett took no action in relation to his conclusions, but in 2006 the FSS introduced 
new guidelines for reporting single particles and low level FDR [1].  Subsequently, in 
response to a request from the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the FSS 
reappraised the FDR evidence in the original trial and concluded that:  
 
“The significance of the FDR findings in this case can be put into context by 
considering two alternative propositions:  
 
Mr George is the man who shot Ms Dando  
Mr George had nothing to do with the incident.  
 
In our opinion the probability of finding a single particle of discharge residue 
in Mr George's coat pocket would have been the same, regardless of which of 
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the above propositions was true. The FDR evidence is thus inconclusive. In 
our opinion it provides no assistance to anyone asked to judge which 
proposition is true.” 
 
In 2007 Barry George was granted an appeal solely on the grounds that the FDR 
evidence, which was relied on by the prosecution at the trial as of great significance, 
was, in reality, ‘neutral’, i.e. of no probative value.  The Appeal was successful with 
the judge concluding: 
 
“It is impossible to know what weight, if any, the jury attached to the FDR 
evidence. It is equally impossible to know what verdict they would have 
reached had they been told as we were told, by the witnesses who gave 
evidence before us, that it was just as likely that the single particle of FDR 
came from some extraneous source as it was that it came from a gun fired by 
the appellant. The verdict is unsafe. The conviction will be quashed.” 
 
5.2 Confusions in the Appeal judgment transcript 
 
The Appeal judgment document demonstrates the challenge of posing LR arguments 
correctly. There are several examples of forensic expert statements that appear to use 
inconsistent and/or ill-defined hypotheses and inconsistent and/or ill-defined 
statements of what the FDR evidence actually was. Indeed, throughout the text, there 
is a failure to state in clear and precise terms what the hypotheses were and what 
evidence was being considered. We re-emphasize that in the discussion below, we are 
showing what was stated in the Appeal Court judgment, and this does not necessarily 
reflect what was actually stated, i.e., statements such as “Keeley said” indicate what 
Keeley was reported to say according to the document not what Keeley necessarily 
actually said. 
 
In what follows we shall assume, as Evett did, that: 
 
Hp is the hypothesis: “BG was the man who shot JD” 
E is the evidence: “A single particle of FDR matching that from the gun that 
killed JD is found in BG coat pocket” 
 
5.2.1 Problems concerning the basic hypotheses 
 
The first fundamental problem concerns both Hp and the alternative (i.e. defence) 
hypothesis Hd. Specifically: 
 
 It is not clear that Hp stated above was really the same prosecution hypothesis 
considered by the experts  
 Whereas Evett assumed, perfectly reasonably, that the defence hypothesis Hd 
was simply “not Hp”, i.e. “BG was not the man who shot JD”, the document 
suggests that the experts did not adhere to this assumption. 
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In fact, the judgment text contains an apparent statement by Keely which directly 
compromises Evett’s assumptions. Specifically, Paragraph 26 of [1], describes Mr 
Keeley’s testimony: 
 
“It was necessary to balance the likelihood that the particle came from a gun 
fired by the appellant and the likelihood that it came from some other source. 
Both were unlikely but both were possible. He did not and could not say that 
one was more likely than the other. In these circumstances the presence of the 
particle provided no support for the proposition that the wearer of the coat had 
fired a gun.” 
 
This statement suggests that Keely’s prosecution hypothesis was not the Hp first stated 
above (that BG shot JD) but rather: 
 
H1p: “The particle found in BG’s pocket came from a gun fired by BG”. 
 
Moreover, the statement suggests that, rather than the original LR narrative presented, 
Keely was making a direct statement about the prior P(H1p) rather than about the 
likelihood P(E | Hp). However, it would be inconsistent to conclude that P(H1p) and 
P(not H1p) are both ‘unlikely’, since these two probability values must sum to one. So 
it is unclear what Keely really meant by  “the likelihood that the particle came from 
some other source”. 
 
Later, in Paragraph 38 we find: 
 
“A single particle of FDR had been found in the pocket of the appellant’s coat. 
According to the evidence that Mr Keeley gave to us, this was an equally 
unlikely event, whether it had come from the cartridge that killed Miss Dando, 
or from some innocent source. There was an even chance that it had resulted 
from innocent contamination.”  
 
This statement suggests that Keely was assuming yet another different prosecution 
hypothesis: 
 
H2p: “The particle found in BG’s pocket came from the gun that killed JD”. 
 
But, since the evidence E forms a logical part of hypothesis H2p, it is a tautological 
fact that  P(E | H2p) must be equal to one. Hence, Keeley cannot have been thinking of 
H2p when he reported a prosecution likelihood of 1/100. However, it does give a very 
clear indication of what Keeley and the other experts and lawyers might have really 
meant as the defence hypothesis. Here (and in many other places) the suggestion is 
that the real alternative cause of the evidence E is a defence hypothesis H2d that refers 
to some form of “innocent contamination”.  By explicitly talking about contamination 
as an alternative cause of E, Paragraph 38 indicates that Keeley did not use “not Hp”, 
i.e. “BG was not the man who shot JD”, as the defence hypothesis. In fact it is highly 
unlikely that any expert could possibly have provided a realistic direct estimate for the 
probability P(E | not Hp). And the indications are clear that the experts did not attempt 
to make such an estimate here. Instead, the experts seem to have considered a 
different but ill-defined defence hypothesis, namely that there were some 
circumstances that could have led to the FDR particle being inserted into BG’s pocket 
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by contamination. So what was the defence hypothesis being considered, which we 
refer to as H1d? It makes no sense to define H1d as “Particle inserted by 
contamination” because in that case P(E  | H1d) is again, trivially equal to one and is 
not 1/100, as reported by Keeley. Instead, we can consider H1d as representing the set 
of conditions under which subsequent contamination may be possible. Paragraph 44 
of [1] uses the notion of the “integrity of BG’s coat being corrupted”. We contend that 
Keeley must therefore have been using a defence hypothesis equivalent to: 
 
H1d: “Integrity of BG coat was corrupted”  
 
When Keeley – and indeed others – referred to the equal likelihoods it seems 
reasonable to assume that they were referring to P(E | Hp) and P(E| H1d). The problem 
is that Hp (“BG was the man who shot JD”) and H1d “Integrity of BG coat was 
corrupted") are not mutually exclusive. It is possible that BG was the man who shot 
JD, but that the FDR particle in his pocket was unrelated to the gun, namely the result 
of contamination from the integrity of the coat being corrupted. In other words both 
Hp and H1d may be true (no matter how unlikely they may be jointly). Calculations in 
supplement [38] Section 8 using the BN structure of Figure 4 and the assumptions in 
the case - show that it is possible that P(E | Hp) = P(E | H1d)   but the evidence E is not 
neutral as concluded by Keeley and accepted by the court.  It favours Hp.  
  
Figure 4 Simple BN model for Barry George case 
5.2.2 Problems concerning the formulation of the evidence 
 
A further problem with the Barry George case is in the formulation of the evidence. 
As in our example in Section 2, there are actually two separate pieces of evidence that 
make up E, namely: 
 
E1:  a single particle of FDR is found in BG coat pocket 
E2:  the single particle found matches that from the gun that killed JD 
 
The failure especially to distinguish between E, E1 and E2 is a fundamental concern 
throughout the appeal judgment. Consider, for example the crucial FSS summarising 
statement (Paragraph 22): 
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“In our opinion, it would be just as likely that a single particle of discharge 
residue would have been recovered from the pocket of BG’s coat whether or 
not he was the person who shot Ms Dando…” 
 
This statement is NOT an assertion that P(E| Hp) = P(E | not Hp) as is clearly assumed. 
It is actually the assertion that P(E1 | Hp) = P(E1 | not Hp). 
 
Although it is possible to combine the two pieces of evidence E1 and E2 into the 
single statement E it is clear that doing so has created confusion for both the experts 
and the lawyers. For example, in Paragraph 17 of  [1] we learn that  
 
Mr Keeley estimated the likelihood of his finding one or a few particles as 1 in 
100 on either proposition. 
 
Ignoring the additional complication of whether finding ‘one particle’ or ‘a few 
particles’ can really be considered the same, Keeley’s assertion is interpreted as 
meaning P(E | Hp) = P(E | Hd) = 0.01. However, elsewhere the focus of E is not on the 
‘unusualness’ of the single particle finding, but rather on the extent to which finding a 
particle that ‘matches’ the ammunition fired by a particular gun actually means the 
particle came from that ammunition. This is the ‘random match probability’ – the 
probability that you would find a particle matching some ammunition given that it 
comes from different ammunition, i.e.  
 
P(E2 |  not H2p)  
 
where H2p is, as defined above, ‘The particle found in BG’s pocket is from the gun 
that killed JD’. 
 
(note the key difference between H2p and the hypothesis H1p that Keeley may have 
unwittingly considered, namely that “The particle found in BG’s pocket came from a 
gun fired by BG”). 
 
It is crucial to note that the likelihood P(E2 | not H2p)  was certainly non-zero, as 
confirmed by the FSS statement (Paragraph 22) which asserted  
 
“The particle is indistinguishable from some of those produced by the round of 
ammunition used to shoot Ms Dando, but a high proportion can produce 
such particles.  
 
It is a significant weakness of the arguments in the appeal judgment transcript that this 
point was not explored elsewhere and that nowhere is any estimate of P(E2 | not H2p) 
provided.  However, the transcript suggests that, when Keeley provided a figure of 
0.01 for P(E | Hd) to Evett, what he actually meant was a completely different 
likelihood, namely P(E2 | not H2p). This possibility is supported by Paragraphs 26 and 
38 of [1], already stated above. 
 
If we were to properly incorporate the distinction between E1 and E2, along with H2p, 
we would need the kind of causal model (represented as a Bayesian network) shown 
in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 More comprehensive causal model 
 
Completing the conditional probabilities (likelihoods) for this revised model (see  
supplement [38] Section 9)  involves eliciting several more probabilities than were 
discussed at the trial. This would actually be helpful to all concerned – the required 
probabilities are not ambiguous like the original ones. Without knowing what these 
probabilities are, we have simply entered values that are very favourable to the 
defence case. Nevertheless the posterior probability of Hp given E1 and E2 still 
increases. So once again, even though we have preserved the ‘equal likelihoods’ 
agreed by the experts, the evidence is far from neutral. It again supports Hp.  
 
What we have not explicitly considered, however, is the relevance of ‘absence of 
evidence’ in the case. Specifically, just as we showed for the example of the ‘tiny 
trace’ of DNA evidence in Section 2 and Appendix 3, it could be argued that the 
absence of anything other than a single FDR particle was more likely under the 
defence hypothesis than the prosecution. This is discussed in supplement [38] Section 
10. 
  
5.2.3 Failure to properly identify multiple different hypotheses and 
their relationships 
 
Most of the above problems and confusions would have been avoided by a clearly 
stated set of hypotheses and evidence so that every explicit (or implicit) statement of 
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conditional probability could have been clearly stated as P(A | B) where A and B were 
unambiguous.   
 
But the problems go much deeper because it is clear that there are many different 
hypotheses being considered in the evidence (and often these are being confused) and 
that it is inconceivable that the experts could have provided all of the appropriate 
likelihoods to come to the conclusions that they did. Here are examples of just some 
of the pairs of different prosecution and defence hypotheses that are mentioned in the 
Appeal ruling (although we accept that some of these are semantically equivalent) [1]:   
 
1. Para 18:  
Prosecution: FDR came from gun that killed victim 
Defence: FDR came from some extraneous source 
 
2. Para 22: 
Prosecution: FDR recovered from BG’s coat pocket, as he was the killer of the 
victim 
Defence: FDR recovered from BG’s coat pocket, but he was not the killer of 
the victim 
 
3. Para 23: 
Prosecution: BG is the man who shot victim 
Defence: BG had nothing to do with the incident 
 
4. Para 26 (i): 
Prosecution: FDR came from a gun fired by BG 
Defence: FDR came from some other source 
 
5. Para 26 (ii): 
Prosecution: The wearer of the coat fired the gun 
Defence: The wearer of the coat did not fire the gun (the defence hypothesis is 
unspecified in the appeal report, but this is one possibility.) 
 
6. Para 27:  
Prosecution: FDR came from a gun fired at the time of the victim’s murder 
Defence: FDR came from some other source 
 
7. Para 28: 
Prosecution: FDR found as a result of BG firing a gun 
Defence: FDR found as a result of secondary contamination 
 
8. Para 32: 
Prosecution: The particle is FDR 
Defence: The particle is not FDR 
 
9. Para 33: 
Prosecution: FDR came from ammunition that killed the victim 
Defence: FDR came from any other ammunition that had that kind of 
percussion primer 
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10. Para 37: 
Prosecution: FDR did not come from secondary contamination 
Defence: FDR came from secondary contamination 
 
11. Para 38:  
Prosecution: FDR came from the cartridge that killed the victim 
Defence: FDR came from some innocent source 
 
12. Para 50: 
Prosecution: FDR was deposited on the coat other than innocently 
Defence: FDR was deposited on the coat innocently 
 
That there must be far more hypotheses involved is evident from the fact that 
numerous probabilistic and quasi-probabilistic statements mentioned in the trial are 
not encapsulated by the grossly simple original Hp, Hd and E alone [1]. A full set of is 
provided in supplement [38] Section 11. 
 
Our final concern relates to the fact that the transcript suggests in places an unnatural 
diagnostic (as opposed to causal) view of evidence. This is discussed in supplement 
[38] Section 12. 
 
6. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
Justice is best served when the evidence and hypotheses under consideration are 
accessible and clear to all parties and are unambiguously defined. In particular, this is 
the only way to assign correct meanings to the likelihoods provided by expert 
witnesses. Furthermore, because the probabitive value of a piece of evidence on 
source-level hypotheses may be very different from its probabitive value on offence-
level hypotheses, the relationships between source-level and offence-level hypotheses  
must be made clear. We have demonstrated that an an efficient way to achieve such 
clarity will require the construction of causal models through the aid of tools such as 
Bayesian networks.  This approach helps to improve legal reasoning and by doing so 
demonstrates how hypotheses can be clarified, related and made precise enough for 
reliable quantificiation. Central to this approach is the distinction between hypotheses 
that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive and those that are not.  
 
We contend that, in order to determine whether evidence has probative value – and 
therefore whether it should be excluded from proceedings or not – it should be 
evaluated against offence-level hypotheses. Any diversion from this key principle will 
carry the risk that evidence might be presented to the jury merely as a diversionary 
tactic, and persuade it to make decisions based on superfluous source-level 
hypotheses.  
 
We have demonstrated serious concerns about the Barry George Appeal Court 
judgment. The case document suffered from oversimplification: what appeared as a 
superficially simple set of hypotheses were actually a set of ill-defined, but related, 
assumptions and vaguely defined hypotheses.  Under these circumstances the ‘simple 
LR rule’ inadequately captured the probative value of the evidence. We have shown 
that evidence with an LR equal to one in this case was not necessarily ‘neutral’.  
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The errors we highlight are taken from a judgment document, and although this may 
not always have accurately recorded what was said in court, the fact that it contains so 
much erroneous reasoning is cause for concern. Clearly, if a case judgment can be 
wraught with so many failings, similar problems are likely to occur in courtroom 
judgments too. Additionally, it is a concern that the careful and rigorous presentations 
of statistical evidence made by conscientious expert witnesses can become distorted in 
a case judgment. 
 
Buried among the numerous muddled arguments present throughout the Barry George 
Appeal transcript, there is a lucid statement that captures a key point we have made in 
this paper: “It is often the case that a piece of evidence that proves nothing when 
viewed in isolation acquires probative value when considered in the context of other 
evidence.” (Paragraph 33) [1]. Thus, the voice of reason was present, but it was 
outnumbered by the numerous imprecise and incorrect arguments scattered 
throughout the Appeal judgment document. In this paper we have provided formal 
and clear explanations in order to illuminate the above point. We present this work 
with the hope that in the future, the voice of reason will not be drowned out by 
erroneous arguments. 
 
While we have focused on the technical issues of our approach to improve 
understanding about the probative value of evidence, it is clear that its success 
depends on incorporating not just semantic features of the argument, but also 
pragmatic and contextual features. These kinds of feature are extremely difficult to 
assess. They are influenced by the cultural background, principles of critical reasoning 
or conversational implicature in assessing the meaning of statements. Ultimately there 
is a need to train forensic scientists and  lawyers not just in the use of BNs to interpret 
arguments, but a wider range of tools for analysing and understanding arguments. 
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Appendix 1 Bayes’ Theorem proof and the probative value of 
evidence for mutually exclusive hypotheses 
 
The following is an example of how the likelihood ratio describes the impact of 
evidence on a pair of mutually exclusive hypotheses: 
 
Appendix Example 1: Suppose that a man is charged with a gambling 
offence, namely that he was using a ‘fixed’ die in which five of the six sides 
were 6’s. Let Hp be the hypothesis that the die was fixed, and let Hd be the 
alternative hypothesis that the die was not fixed (i.e. it was a ‘fair’ die). The 
evidence E is the observation that the outcome of two consecutive rolls of the 
die were two 6s. Then 
 
P(E | Hp) = 25/36 
 
Whereas 
 
P(E | Hd) = 1/36. 
 
In this case the prosecution likelihood is 25 times greater than the defence likelihood, 
i.e. the LR is 25. In the above example, the fact that the prosecution likelihood is 25 
times greater than the defence likelihood suggests intuitively that the evidence E 
supports the prosecution hypothesis. In fact, it can be proven that when prosecution 
and defence hypotheses are mutually exclusive, a LR of greater than one supports the 
prosecution hypothesis and a LR of less than one supports the defence hypothesis. 
Hence, the LR has a simple interpretation for the probative value of the evidence 
under these assumptions, and the proof is as follows: 
 
In order to prove this important property of the LR, we need Bayes’ theorem 
 
Bayes’ Theorem tells us that: 
 
( | ) ( )
( | )
( )
P E H P H
P H E
P E
  
 
 
By applying Bayes’ theorem to both Hp and Hd we get the equivalent form of Bayes 
(called the ‘odds’ version): 
 
( | ) ( | ) ( )
( | ) ( | ) ( )
P P P
D D D
P H E P E H P H
P H E P E H P H
   
 
In this version the term  
 
( | )
( | )
P
D
P E H
P E H
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is the likelihood ratio (LR) – it is simply the prosecution likelihood divided by the 
defence likelihood.  
The term 
 
( )
( )
P
D
P H
P H
 
represents the ‘prior odds’ – the relative prior belief in the prosecution hypothesis 
over the defence hypothesis. 
 
The term 
 
( | )
( | )
P
D
P H E
P H E
 
 
represents the revised  ‘posterior odds’ – the relative (posterior) belief in the 
prosecution hypothesis over the defence hypothesis having observed the evidence E.  
 
Most texts that attempt to explain the impact of the LR on the probative value of E use 
an argument based on the relative ‘odds’ of the hypotheses. The formula tells us that 
whatever our prior odds were in favour of the prosecution hypothesis, the posterior 
odds are the result of multiplying the prior odds by the LR. Hence, when the 
prosecution likelihood is greater than the defence likelihood the posterior odds in 
favour of the prosecution hypothesis must increase.  
 
However, this argument it is unnecessarily confusing, because not only does it hide 
the assumption that the hypotheses need to be mutually exclusive for it to work, but it 
also fails to tell us clearly what we most need to know: namely that for the evidence E 
to ‘support’ the hypothesis Hp it is necessary that the posterior probability of Hp, i.e. 
P(Hp | E) is greater than the prior probability P(Hp) in other words our belief in Hp 
being true increases after we observe E.  
 
What follows is a proof that P(Hp | E) > P(Hp) when the LR is greater than 1: 
 
From Bayes’ Theorem:  
( | ) ( | ) ( )
( | ) ( | ) ( )
P P P
D D D
P H E P E H P H
P H E P E H P H
   
 
But since the LR > 1 it follows that: 
 
( | ) ( )
( | ) ( )
P P
D D
P H E P H
P H E P H
  
 
But because Hd = not Hp we know that 
  
( ) 1 ( )  and   ( | ) 1 ( | )D P D PP H P H P H E P H E     
 
Hence, substituting these into the above inequality equation we get: 
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( | ) ( )
1 ( | ) 1 ( )
( | )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( | )
( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( ) ( | )
( | ) ( )
P P
P p
P p P P
P p P P P P
P P
P H E P H
P H E P H
P H E P H P H P H E
P H E P H P H E P H P H P H E
P H E P H

 
   
   
 
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Appendix 2. Neutral evidence 
 
First we prove that evidence E is neutral when the LR is 1 and when the prosecution 
and defence hypotheses are mutually exclusive.  
 
Since the LR is 1 we know that P(E | Hp) = P(E | Hd) 
 
( | ) ( )
( | )
( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( )
( | ) ( )
since ( | ) ( | )
( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( )
( | ) ( )
since ( | ) ( | )
( | )( ( ) ( ))
( | ) ( )
since ( ) ( ) 1 as
( | )
P P
P
P P D D
P P
P D
P P P D
P P
P D
P P D
P P
P D
P
P E H P H
P H E
P E H P H P E H P H
P E H P H
P E H P E H
P E H P H P E H P H
P E H P H
P E H P E H
P E H P H P H
P E H P H
P H P H
P E H


 

 

    ( ), ( ) mutually exclusive and exhaustive
= ( )
P D
P
P H P H
P H
 
What happens when the LR =1 but Hp and Hd are not mutually exclusive?  From the 
odds version of Bayes’ we know that  
 
( | ) ( )
( | ) ( )
P P
D D
P H E P H
P H E P H
  
 
So all we can actually conclude is that the ratio of the posterior probabilities of Hp and 
Hd is equal to the ratio of the prior probabilities.  
 
 
 
  
31 
 
Appendix 3: The Bayesian Network modelling approach 
 
As Appendix 2 indicates, even the simplest application of Bayes’ theorem (namely 
when we have  a single pair of mutually exclusive hypotheses and a single piece of 
evidence) can involve quite complex calculations. When there are multiple hypotheses 
and different (possibly related) pieces of evidence it is impossible to do the 
calculations correctly by hand. Fortunately, there is a well established formalism – 
Bayesian networks [20][21][36] – supported by widely available tools [19], that 
enables all the Bayesian calculations to be performed automatically once the priors 
and likelihoods are specified by the experts.  
 
In a Bayesian network (BN) the nodes represent variables (such as hypotheses and 
evidence) which have different state values (such as false and true) while the arcs 
drawn between nodes represent known dependencies between the variables. The set of 
states of a variable in a BN are, by definition, always mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. Hence: 
 
{‘true’, ‘false’},  
{“guilty”, “not guilty”},  
{“Fred shot the gun”, “Joe shot the gun”, “neither Fred nor Joe shot the gun”} 
would all acceptable sets of states for a BN node, while 
{“Fred shot the gun”, “Fred or Joe shot the gun”) 
would not be acceptable.  
 
While the calculations are automatically computed from a given model they are, of 
course, critically dependant on the choice of model. One of the confusions associated 
with using BNs for legal reasoning is that there are actually two fundamentally 
different ways to model hypotheses. If the prosecution and defence hypotheses are 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive then a simple and natural way to represent them  is 
to model them as the states of a single hypothesis node, as in either of the versions of  
Figure 6(i).  
 
 
 
 
 
(i) Two equivalent representations in which the 
alternative hypotheses are represented as the 
different possible states of a single 
hypothesis nodes 
 (ii) Alternative, structurally different 
representation in which the alternative 
hypotheses are represented as the 
different (Boolean) nodes 
Figure 6 Representing hypotheses as either (i) states of a single unknown variable or 
as (ii) separate unknown (Boolean) variables 
 
However, for reasons explained in  [18], it is sometimes preferable to use separate 
nodes for the prosecution and defence hypotheses. The fundamental problem with this 
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approach is that there is no general mechanism for ensuring that separate nodes in a 
BN are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. For the case of two hypotheses it is 
possible to ‘force’ mutual exclusivity by introducing a link as shown in Figure 6(ii). 
However, this does not extend to more than two mutually exclusive hypotheses   [18]. 
 
When the defence and prosecution hypotheses are not mutually exclusive (for 
example, if Hp is “defendant guilty” and Hd is “defendant not at crime scene”) then 
we can – and indeed must - represent the hypotheses as separate (Boolean) nodes as 
shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7 Representing hypotheses that are not mutually excusive and exhaustive 
The method we propose here (and the one that is used in all examples) is: 
 
 When the hypotheses are mutually exclusive use a single node whose states 
correspond to these hypotheses (so we adopt the approach in Figure 6(i) in this 
case) 
 
 When the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive we use separate (Boolean) 
nodes to correspond to each hypotheseis (so we adopt the approach in Figure 
7). 
 
Once the hypotheses are carefully considered and modelled in this way we use the BN 
to model the causal story linking hypotheses and different pieces of evidence. In 
addition to its causal structure we have to specify, for each node in the BN having 
parents, a conditional probability table. Specifically this requires us to specify the 
probability of each state of the node conditional on each combination of parent states. 
For a node with one parent such as node E in Figure 6(i), this table would be one such 
as shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 8 Conditional probability table for node with one parent 
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The value in the bottom left cell is precisely the defence likelihood , P(E | Hd) while 
the value in the bottom right cell is precisely the prosecution likelihood , P(E | Hp). 
The other cells are simply one minus these values respectively since they correspond 
to , P(not E | Hd)  and P(not E | Hd) respectively.  Hence specifiying the conditional 
probability table for E is nothing more and nothing less than specifying the likelihood 
values. 
 
For a node with more than one parent, such as node E in Figure 7, the conditional 
probability table would be one such as shown in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9 Conditional probability table for node with two parents 
The cell entries in the bottom row again correspond to likelihood values. But note 
that, because Hp and Hd are not assumed to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive it is 
not sufficient to specify just P(E | Hd) and P(E | Hp). Instead we are forced to specify 
the likelihood values for the different  mutually exclusive state combinations.   
 
Many examples of completed BNs are provided in the complementary material [39] 
but we present one example here to solve the problem described in Section 2 of the 
main text where we have the evidence E: “tiny matching DNA trace found” that 
actually comprises two separate pieces of evidence: 
 
 E1: tiny DNA trace found 
 E2: DNA trace found matches defendant 
 
The example assumes that Hp is ‘defendant guilty’ and Hp is “defendant not guilty” . 
Hence, we use a single node to model these mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
hypotheses. The oversimplistic model is therefore shown in Figure 10(i). The correct 
model is shown in Figure 10(ii). 
 
 
 
 
(i) Original representation  (ii) Correct representation 
Figure 10 Modelling complex evidence in a BN 
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Suppose that the DNA trace has a profile with a random match probability of 1/100. 
In the oversimplistic model the expert would typically provides the likelihoods: 
 
P(E| Hp) = 1  
P(E| Hd) = 1/100 
 
In other words the conditional probabilty table for the node E is defined as shown in 
Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11 Conditional probability table for  node E 
The LR in this case is therefore 100.  This can also be seen by executing the model, 
with the evidence E entered as true, as shown in Figure 12  (to ensure the LR is the 
same as the posterior odds of guilty we set the prior odds to be 50:50). 
 
 
Figure 12 Posterior odds of guilt. 
 
However, what the oversimplistic model completely fails to capture is relevance of 
the fact that the trace was tiny. If the defendant were guilty it is expected that the 
investigator would have found significant traces of DNA. The significance of the tiny 
trace is properly captured by separating out E1 in the second model. A reasonable 
conditional probability table for E1 is shown in Figure 13.  
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Figure 13 Conditional probability table for E1 
The conditional probability table for E2 shown in Figure 14 captures uses the same 
RMP information as was used in the oversimplified model. 
 
 
Figure 14 Conditional probability table for E2 
Calculating the overall LR manually in this case is much more complex, so we go 
directly to the result of running the model with E2 set as true (and the prior odds of 
guilt set at 50:50 again). This is shown in Figure 15. The LR is just the probability of 
guilty divided by the probability of not guilty, which is 0.2. So the evidence supports 
the defence hypothesis rather than the prosecution.  
 
 
Figure 15 Posterior odds in correct model 
 
This example also indicates the importance of taking account of absence of evidence. 
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Supplementary Material 1: Supporting Calculations and Examples 
 
1. Calculations for Example 1  
 
( ) ( ) 0.5
( | , ) 0.9
( | , not ) 0.9
( | not , ) 0.9
( | not , not ) 0
( | ) ( | , ) ( ) ( | , not ) (not ) 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9
( | ) ( | , ) ( ) ( | , not ) (n
P D
P D
P D
P D
P D
P P D D P D D
D D P P D P
P H P H
P E H H
P E H H
P E H H
P E H H
Then
P E H P E H H P H P E H H P H
and
P E H P E H H P H P E H H P
 




      
  ot ) 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9
( | ) ( | ) i.e. the LR is equal to 1
Now we can also use marginalisation to compute ( ) :
( ) ( | , ) ( ) ( ) ( | , not ) ( ) (not )
( | not , ) (not )
P
P D
P D P D P D P D
P D D
H
so
P E H P E H
P E
P E P E H H P H P H P E H H P H P H
P E H H P H
    

  
 ( ) ( | not , not ) (not ) (not )
(0.9 0.5 0.5) (0.9 0.5 0.5) (0.9 0.5 0.5) 0
0.675
Hence by Bayes:
( | ) ( ) 0.9 0.5
( | ) 0.666
( ) 0.675
Similarly:
( | ) ( ) 0.9 0.5
( | ) 0.
( ) 0.675
D P D D D
P P
P
D D
D
P H P E H H P H P H
P E H P H
P H E
P E
P E H P H
P H E
P E

         


  

   666
 
Next we add the motive evidence. Because this scenario involves four related 
variables the Bayesian calculations are rather too complex to demonstrate from 
scratch and so we use a Bayesian network software tool.  
 
Figure 16 shows the prior probabilities. 
 
 
37 
 
 
Figure 16 Prior probabilities for murder model 
 
Figure 17 shows the results of observing the motive evidence E’. In this case P(Hp | 
E’) =  0.875, while P(Hd | E’) is unchanged at 0.5.  
 
 
Figure 17 Posterior probabilities for murder model after observing evidence of motive 
When we now observe E (Figure 18) we see that the probability of Hp, that is P(Hp 
|E’, E), jumps to 0.933. The evidence E therefore may be sufficient in this case to 
convince a jury to convict (if there were, say a threshold of 90% certainty required). 
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Figure 18  Posterior probabilities for murder model after observing evidence of motive and 
overheard conversation 
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2. Dice example (non-mutually exclusive hypotheses): LR=1 but 
evidence is not neutral 
 
 
Example S1: The defendant rolls two dice – a black die which he owns and a 
red die randomly selected by a member of the public from a batch provided by 
a reputable dice company. The evidence E against the defendant is that both 
dice rolls are 6s. However, in this case the prosecution hypothesis Hp concerns 
only the black die, while the defence hypothesis Hd concerns only the red die: 
 
Hp: “The black die is fixed with all sides being 6s”  
Hd: “The red die is fixed with all sides being 6s” 
 
The reason Hd is the defence hypotheses is because it was subsequently discovered 
that the red die came from a batch in which 50% were faulty in the sense of having all 
sides sixes. Hence, the prior P(Hd)=1/2. Suppose the prior P(Hp)=1/2 because it is 
known that 50% of the defendant’s black dice are fixed with all sides being 6s. 
 
Then we have: 
𝑃(𝐻𝑝) =
1
2
 
 
𝑃(𝐻𝑑) =
1
2
 
 
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝑝, 𝐻𝑑) = 1 
 
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝑝, not 𝐻𝑑) = 1/6 
𝑃(𝐸|not 𝐻𝑝, 𝐻𝑑) = 1/6 
𝑃(𝐸|not 𝐻𝑝,not 𝐻𝑑) = 1/36 
 
It follows that  P(E|Hp)=P(E|Hd) = 7/12 because: 
 
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝑝) =  𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝑝, 𝐻𝑑)𝑃(𝐻𝑑) + 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝑝, not 𝐻𝑑)𝑃(not 𝐻𝑑)
=
1
6
+
1
6
×
1
2
=
7
12
 
 
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝑑) =  𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝑑, 𝐻𝑝)𝑃(𝐻𝑝) + 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝑑, not 𝐻𝑝)𝑃(not 𝐻𝑝)
=
1
6
+
1
6
×
1
2
=
7
12
 
 
 
So LR=1, but the evidence is not neutral as can be seen from the results of running the 
model in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 Evidence not neutral 
 
The fact that P(Hp|E)= 6/7 = 0.85714 tells us that the prosecution hypothesis is now 
very likely. Just because the defence hypothesis has increased by the same amount is 
essentially irrelevant.    
Formally, the calculations are based on Bayes’ theorem and noting that the marginal 
P(E) is 
 
𝑃(𝐸) =  𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝑝, 𝐻𝑑)𝑃(𝐻𝑝)𝑃(𝐻𝑑) + 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝑝, not 𝐻𝑑)𝑃(𝐻𝑝)𝑃(not 𝐻𝑑)
+  𝑃(𝐸|not 𝐻𝑝, 𝐻𝑑)𝑃(not 𝐻𝑝)𝑃(𝐻𝑑)
+  𝑃(𝐸|not  𝐻𝑑, not 𝐻𝑝)𝑃(not 𝐻𝑝)𝑃(not 𝐻𝑑) 
 
= (1 ×
1
2
×
1
2
) + (
1
6
×
1
2
×
1
2
) + (
1
6
×
1
2
×
1
2
) + (
1
36
×
1
2
×
1
2
) 
 
=49/144=0.34028 
 
Hence by Bayes’ 
 
𝑃(𝐻𝑝) =
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝑝) × 𝑃(𝐻𝑝)
𝑃(𝐸)
=
7
12 ×
1
2
49
144
=
6
7
 
 
Thus, as in Example 1 from the main text, the fact that the posterior for Hp and Hd 
increase in the same proportions from their priors is less important than the fact that 
the posterior for Hp is now more likely than unlikely. 
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3. Dice example (non-mutually exclusive hypotheses): LR<0.5 but 
evidence favours prosecution not defence. 
 
Next we consider a slight variation of example S1 in which the LR is not 1 but 
actually favours the ‘wrong’ hypothesis. 
 
Example S2: This is the same as Example S2, except in this case the red die came 
from a batch in which it was subequently found that 10% were faulty (‘all six’) 
dice.  Hence the prior P(Hd)=0.1  
 
 
In this case  P(E|Hd) = 7/12 = 0.5833  as before. However, P(E|Hp) = ¼ = 0.25 
 
So the defence likelihood is more than twice the prosecution likelihood, i.e. LR <0.5. 
According to the FSS guidelines on the likelihood ratio we should be able to conclude 
that the evidence provides support for the defence hypothesis. But this is nonsense 
because what matters is that, as before, P(Hp|E)= 0.86 (see Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20 Evidence leads to  strong belief in Hp 
 
As before the evidence shows it is now very likely that the prosecution hypothesis is 
true. Just because the probability the defence hypothesis has increased by a bigger 
percentage is again essentially irrelevant.  
 
So while it is true that the proportional increase in the probability of Hd (from 0.1 to 
0.4) is greater than that of Hp (from 0.5 to 0.86), this is irrelevant from the perspective 
of the probative value of the evidence. If Hp is true it does not matter whether or not 
Hd is also true; the evidence E provides strong support for Hp being true. 
 
In other words the ‘probative value’ of the evidence is exactly the opposite of what is 
normally assumed of a LR. But things can get much worse. If the evidence in 
Example 2 was three 6s rolled on each of the dice then the defence likelihood 
becomes about 50 times greater than the prosecution likelihood, but the impact of the 
evidence is such that the prosecution hypothesis is almost certain (0.9954).   
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4. Example of LR mistaken to be 1 
 
Using exactly Example S2 we can illustrate how it is easy to be deceived into thinking 
evidence might have an  LR of 1 when it does not. This is because both of the 
‘intuitive’ likelihoods are the same: 
 
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝑝, not 𝐻𝑑) = 1/6 
𝑃(𝐸|not 𝐻𝑝, 𝐻𝑑) = 1/6 
 
However, the intuitive likelihoods fail to take account of the non-exclusivity 
of the hypotheses, i.e. the fact that both Hp and Hd might be true. Indeed as we 
already saw in Example 2, in this case  P(E|Hd) = 7/12 = 0.5833,  while 
P(E|Hp) = ¼ = 0.25 
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5. Calculations for Example 4 of main text (non exhautive 
hypotheses) 
 
Figure 21(a) shows the prior marginals when P(E | Hp) = P(E | Hd) = 0.01 and  P(E | 
Ha) = 0.5.  Figure 21(b) shows the resulting posterior marginals when E is entered as 
true. 
 
 
 
(a) Prior marginals (b) Posteriors after evidence E observed 
Figure 21 Prior and posterior probabilities for the problem in Example 2. 
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6. Calculations for Example 4 in main text 
 
The BN for Example 3 in the main text shown in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22 BN in Example 3 
 
Here the secondary hypothesis H1p of whether Fred owned the gun is a parent of the 
ultimate hypothesis Hp. This is a classic example of an ‘opportunity’ node [26].  For 
our current analysis we assume that Fred will be equally likely to have fired the gun 
regardless of whether he owned it (i.e., chance that Fred fired the gun does not depend 
on whether he owned it). We assume that, before the evidence, the prior probability 
that Fred fired the gun is 1/00.  This gives us the conditional probability table for P(Hp 
|  H) shown in Figure 23: 
 
 
 
Figure 23 Conditional probability table for Hp: Fred fired the gun that killed Bob 
 
The table shows that Fred is just as likely to use the gun whether he owns it or not 
(thus the link between H1p and Hp is actually redundant). Now we need the 
conditional probability table for the evidence given the two sets of hypotheses, P(E | 
Hp, H1p). This is shown in Figure 24 
 
use 
 
Figure 24 Conditional probability table for evidence E: Gun found in Fred’s house 
 
Here we again made the reasonable assumption that if Fred fired the gun it is just as 
likely E will be true whether or not he owned it and this likelihood is 1/10. Similarly 
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if he did not fire the gun it is just as likely the evidence would be observed (E=true)  
whether or not he owned the gun, but in the case these equal probabilities are lower 
(1/100) than in the case if he did fire the gun. 
 
The prior state of the model with the above conditional probability tables is shown in 
Figure 25 
 
Figure 25 Prior state of the BN 
 
Now we use the BN to calculate the probability of evidence E under the two values 
for H1p, which means setting the node for ‘Fred owned the gun’ to True and False 
respectively.  The screen shots from the BN calculation (Figure 26) show that the 
likelihoods P(E|H1p) and P(E|not H1p) are equal and hence the LR with respect to H1p 
is 1. 
 
 
 
P(E | H1p) = 0.9891 (unchanged from prior) P(E | not H1p) = 0.9891 (unchanged from prior) 
Figure 26 Calculating the probability of evidence E under the two values for H1p (True on left 
hand side, False on right hand side) 
 
When we observe the evidence (set E=true) we get the result shown in Figure 27.  
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Figure 27 Evidence is observed 
 
We see that the evidence has not changed H1p, i.s. P(H1p | E) = P(H1p) = 50%, and 
thus the evidence is ‘neutral’ with respect to whether Fred owned the gun. However, 
P(Hp |E ) is not equal to Hp—the probability has increased from 1%  to 9.17%. Thus, 
the evidence is not neutral with respect to the ultimate hypothesis: the evidence 
increases the chance of Fred being guilty of murder. 
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7. Offence level hypotheses appear exhaustive but are not 
 
In many situations even the offence level hypotheses "guilty or not guilty" may 
actually hide implict assumptions that suggest the hypotheses are not exhaustive (so 
that we are back in the situation described in Section 3.2). An example would be 
where there is an implict assumption that a crime has actually taken place (for 
example, a murder) even though there is a small probability (ignored by both sides) 
that the victim was not actually murdered. In such a situation the 'offence level' 
hypotheses Hp ("guilty") and Hd ("not guilty") are wrongly assumed to be exhaustive 
because what they actually mean are "murder was committed by the defendant" and 
"murder was committed by somebody other than the defendant" respectively.  What is 
missing is the hypothesis Hn "no crime committed". 
 
Suppose  we have the evidence E: "victim left a suicide note".   
 
Then clearly P(E | Hp) = P(E | Hd) since the probability of finding a suicide note 
would not be changed by knowing the identity of the person charged with murder. It 
follows that the LR is equal to one for the 'offense level' hypotheses, and so this piece 
of evidence would be (erroneously) regarded as having no probative value.  But while 
it has no impact on Hp and Hd when the probability of Hn is assumed to be zero 
(Figure 28, Case A),  it certainly does have an impact when the probability Hn is not 
zero (Figure 28, Case B where we assume a 1% probability).   
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Case A: when probability of 'no crime 
committed' is ignored 
 Case B: when probability of 'no crime 
committed' is  not ignored (we assume 
small probability 1%) 
 
 
 
(A1) Prior probabilities  (B1) Prior probabilities 
 
 
 
(A2) Posterior probabilities when suicide node 
evidence found: No change in probability of guilt 
 (B2) Posterior probabilities when suicide node 
evidence found: increase in probability of no crime 
resulting in decrease in probability defendant guilty 
of murder 
Figure 28 The importance of considering the correct offence level hypotheses.  
 
In both cases we make the same assumptions about P(E | Hp), P(E | Hd), P(E | Hn). 
Specifically, that P(E | Hp) = P(E | Hd) = 0.01 and P(E | Hn) = 0.1. The actual values 
do not matter. All that matters is that P(E | Hp) = P(E | Hd) are equal and that P(E | Hn) 
is greater.  
 
An alternative way to consider this problem is to separate out the pair of offence-level 
hypotheses "guilty/not guilty" from the ultimate hypotheses "crime committed/crime 
not committed". This is shown in Figure 29. 
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Case A: when probability of 'no crime 
committed' is ignored 
 Case B: when probability of 'no crime 
committed' is  not ignored (we assume 
small probability 1%) 
 
 
 
(A1) Prior probabilities  (B1) Prior probabilities 
 
 
 
(A2) Posterior probabilities when suicide node 
evidence found: No change in probability of guilt 
 (B2) Posterior probabilities when suicide node 
evidence found: increase in probability of no crime 
resulting in decrease in probability of guilty 
Figure 29 Separating out the pair of offence level hypotheses from the ultimate hypotheses.  
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8. Basic Barry George FDR evidence 
 
 
Figure 30 BN with separate pairs of hypotheses 
 
We assume that the conditional probabilities are defined as: 
 
P(E| Hp, not H1d) = 0.01 
P(E| H1d, not Hp)= 0.01 
- these are the most reasonable assumptions from Keeley’s assertions to Evett. 
 
However, since Hp and H1d can clearly both be true at the same time we also need to 
define P(E| Hp and H1d) and it seems reasonable to define this as  
P(E| Hp and H1d) = 0.02  (in fact the exact probability matters little as far as 
illustrating the problem, but it is certainly non-zero and it must be greater than 0.01). 
 
Assuming P(Hp)=P(H1d)=0.5 we get the following results: 
 
P(E| Hp) = P(E |H1d) = 0.015, as shown in Figure 31, which confirms that the 
likelihoods are equal as assumed by Keeley and Evett. However, this certainly does 
not mean the evidence E is neutral because, as shown Figure 31(b)  P(Hp | E) = 0.75, 
which an increase from the prior 0.5 (shown in Figure 31(a)).  
Even though P(H1d |E) is also increased by exactly the same amount (by virtue of the 
rather unrealistic equal priors for both hypotheses) the increase in P(Hp |E) is what 
actually matters.   
 
  
a) Hp  set true, showing P(E| Hp) = 0.015 b) H1d set to true, showing P(E |H1d) = 0.015 
Figure 31 Calculating P(E|Hypothesis) for the two different hypotheses Hp and H1d respectively 
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(a) prior marginal probabilities (b) posterior probabilities after E is observed 
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9. More realistic Barry George Model 
 
The more realistic causal model incorporating appropriate hypotheses and evidence is 
shown in Figure 32. 
 
 
Figure 32 More realistic BN model 
 
Completing the conditional probabilities (likelihoods) for this revised model involves 
eliciting several more probabilities than were discussed at the trial. This would 
actually be helpful to all concerned – the required probabilities are not ambiguous like 
the original ones. Without knowing what these probabilities are, we have simply 
entered values that are most favourable to the defence case. Nevertheless the posterior 
probability of Hp given E1 and E2 still increases as shown in  
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Appendix 3: The Bayesian Network modelling approach 
 
As Appendix 2 indicates, even the simplest application of Bayes’ theorem (namely 
when we have  a single pair of mutually exclusive hypotheses and a single piece of 
evidence) can involve quite complex calculations. When there are multiple hypotheses 
and different (possibly related) pieces of evidence it is impossible to do the 
calculations correctly by hand. Fortunately, there is a well established formalism – 
Bayesian networks [20][21][36] – supported by widely available tools [19], that 
enables all the Bayesian calculations to be performed automatically once the priors 
and likelihoods are specified by the experts.  
 
In a Bayesian network (BN) the nodes represent variables (such as hypotheses and 
evidence) which have different state values (such as false and true) while the arcs 
drawn between nodes represent known dependencies between the variables. The set of 
states of a variable in a BN are, by definition, always mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. Hence: 
 
{‘true’, ‘false’},  
{“guilty”, “not guilty”},  
{“Fred shot the gun”, “Joe shot the gun”, “neither Fred nor Joe shot the gun”} 
would all acceptable sets of states for a BN node, while 
{“Fred shot the gun”, “Fred or Joe shot the gun”) 
would not be acceptable.  
 
While the calculations are automatically computed from a given model they are, of 
course, critically dependant on the choice of model. One of the confusions associated 
with using BNs for legal reasoning is that there are actually two fundamentally 
different ways to model hypotheses. If the prosecution and defence hypotheses are 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive then a simple and natural way to represent them  is 
to model them as the states of a single hypothesis node, as in either of the versions of  
Figure 6(i).  
 
 
 
 
 
(iii) Two equivalent representations in which 
the alternative hypotheses are represented as 
the different possible states of a single 
hypothesis nodes 
 (iv) Alternative, structurally different 
representation in which the alternative 
hypotheses are represented as the 
different (Boolean) nodes 
Figure 6 Representing hypotheses as either (i) states of a single unknown variable or 
as (ii) separate unknown (Boolean) variables 
 
However, for reasons explained in  [18], it is sometimes preferable to use separate 
nodes for the prosecution and defence hypotheses. The fundamental problem with this 
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approach is that there is no general mechanism for ensuring that separate nodes in a 
BN are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. For the case of two hypotheses it is 
possible to ‘force’ mutual exclusivity by introducing a link as shown in Figure 6(ii). 
However, this does not extend to more than two mutually exclusive hypotheses   [18]. 
 
When the defence and prosecution hypotheses are not mutually exclusive (for 
example, if Hp is “defendant guilty” and Hd is “defendant not at crime scene”) then 
we can – and indeed must - represent the hypotheses as separate (Boolean) nodes as 
shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7 Representing hypotheses that are not mutually excusive and exhaustive 
The method we propose here (and the one that is used in all examples) is: 
 
 When the hypotheses are mutually exclusive use a single node whose states 
correspond to these hypotheses (so we adopt the approach in Figure 6(i) in this 
case) 
 
 When the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive we use separate (Boolean) 
nodes to correspond to each hypotheseis (so we adopt the approach in Figure 
7). 
 
Once the hypotheses are carefully considered and modelled in this way we use the BN 
to model the causal story linking hypotheses and different pieces of evidence. In 
addition to its causal structure we have to specify, for each node in the BN having 
parents, a conditional probability table. Specifically this requires us to specify the 
probability of each state of the node conditional on each combination of parent states. 
For a node with one parent such as node E in Figure 6(i), this table would be one such 
as shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 8 Conditional probability table for node with one parent 
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The value in the bottom left cell is precisely the defence likelihood , P(E | Hd) while 
the value in the bottom right cell is precisely the prosecution likelihood , P(E | Hp). 
The other cells are simply one minus these values respectively since they correspond 
to , P(not E | Hd)  and P(not E | Hd) respectively.  Hence specifiying the conditional 
probability table for E is nothing more and nothing less than specifying the likelihood 
values. 
 
For a node with more than one parent, such as node E in Figure 7, the conditional 
probability table would be one such as shown in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9 Conditional probability table for node with two parents 
The cell entries in the bottom row again correspond to likelihood values. But note 
that, because Hp and Hd are not assumed to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive it is 
not sufficient to specify just P(E | Hd) and P(E | Hp). Instead we are forced to specify 
the likelihood values for the different  mutually exclusive state combinations.   
 
Many examples of completed BNs are provided in the complementary material [39] 
but we present one example here to solve the problem described in Section 2 of the 
main text where we have the evidence E: “tiny matching DNA trace found” that 
actually comprises two separate pieces of evidence: 
 
 E1: tiny DNA trace found 
 E2: DNA trace found matches defendant 
 
The example assumes that Hp is ‘defendant guilty’ and Hp is “defendant not guilty” . 
Hence, we use a single node to model these mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
hypotheses. The oversimplistic model is therefore shown in Figure 10(i). The correct 
model is shown in Figure 10(ii). 
 
 
 
 
(iii) Original representation  (iv) Correct representation 
Figure 10 Modelling complex evidence in a BN 
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Suppose that the DNA trace has a profile with a random match probability of 1/100. 
In the oversimplistic model the expert would typically provides the likelihoods: 
 
P(E| Hp) = 1  
P(E| Hd) = 1/100 
 
In other words the conditional probabilty table for the node E is defined as shown in 
Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11 Conditional probability table for  node E 
The LR in this case is therefore 100.  This can also be seen by executing the model, 
with the evidence E entered as true, as shown in Figure 12  (to ensure the LR is the 
same as the posterior odds of guilty we set the prior odds to be 50:50). 
 
 
Figure 12 Posterior odds of guilt. 
 
However, what the oversimplistic model completely fails to capture is relevance of 
the fact that the trace was tiny. If the defendant were guilty it is expected that the 
investigator would have found significant traces of DNA. The significance of the tiny 
trace is properly captured by separating out E1 in the second model. A reasonable 
conditional probability table for E1 is shown in Figure 13.  
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Figure 13 Conditional probability table for E1 
The conditional probability table for E2 shown in Figure 14 captures uses the same 
RMP information as was used in the oversimplified model. 
 
 
Figure 14 Conditional probability table for E2 
Calculating the overall LR manually in this case is much more complex, so we go 
directly to the result of running the model with E2 set as true (and the prior odds of 
guilt set at 50:50 again). This is shown in Figure 15. The LR is just the probability of 
guilty divided by the probability of not guilty, which is 0.2. So the evidence supports 
the defence hypothesis rather than the prosecution.  
 
 
Figure 15 Posterior odds in correct model 
 
This example also indicates the importance of taking account of absence of evidence.. 
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(a) prior marginal probabilities (i.e. before 
evidence is observed) 
(b) posterior probabilities ((i.e. after 
evidence is observed) 
Figure 33 Impact of the evidence  
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10. Failure to properly incorporate the notion of ‘absence of 
evidence’ 
 
There is great confusion throughout the Barry George appeal judgment transcript 
about the fact that a single particle was found rather than a large collection. There are 
suggestions in the transcript that finding only a ‘small number of particles’ - which 
can actually mean up to 20 -  is more likely to result from contamination than the 
actual firing of a gun. There is no discussion of the different prosecution and defence 
likelihoods associated with different numbers of particles, presumably on the 
assumption that this would be redundant for any number other than one (one being the 
number in E). While the latter would certainly be unnecessary there is, however, one 
important additional piece of evidence (which surely favours the defence) that should 
have been considered in the likelihood values was: 
 
E3: failure to find particles elsewhere in BG’s apartment or possessions.  
 
While this introduces significant extra complexity into the model (which would 
therefore be more complex than that in Appendix 9) the concern is that E3 may 
actually have been consciously or unconsciously ‘factored’ in to the evidence E when 
the likelihoods were estimated. In other words the experts may have been considering 
likelihoods like P(E1 and E2 and E3 | Hp) and if so it would have been difficult to do 
so consistently. 
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11. Probabilistic and quasi-probabilistic statements mentioned in the 
BG trial not encapsulated by the simple original hypotheses 
 
1. Para 9: 
 
“In Mr Keeley's experience FDR would more often than not be found on the 
firer of the gun, but would not be found on ordinary members of the public 
unless they had been associated with firearms.” 
 
2. Para 22: 
 
“In our opinion, it would be just as likely that a single particle of discharge 
residue would have been recovered from the pocket of Mr George's coat 
whether or not he was the person who shot Ms Dando nearly a year 
previously.” 
 
3. Para 23: 
 
“Mr George is the man who shot Ms Dando 
Mr George had nothing to do with the incident.” 
 
“In our opinion the probability of finding a single particle of discharge residue 
in Mr George's coat pocket would have been the same, regardless of which of 
the above propositions was true.” 
 
4. Para 26: 
 
“It was necessary to balance the likelihood that the particle came from a gun 
fired by the appellant and the likelihood that it came from some other source. 
Both were unlikely but both were possible. He did not and could not say that 
one was more likely than the other. In these circumstances the presence of the 
particle provided no support for the proposition that the wearer of the coat had 
fired a gun.” 
 
5. Para 27: 
 
“Mr Keeley said that he had intended to convey to the jury that it was no more 
likely that the single particle of FDR came from a gun fired at the time of Miss 
Dando's murder than that it came from some other source.” 
 
6. Para 28: 
 
“Dr Renshaw s (who had also given evidence at the trial) evidence accorded 
with that of Mr Keeley. While it was unlikely that the particle had resulted 
from secondary contamination of the coat it was equally unlikely that it was 
the result of the appellant firing a gun a year before.” 
 
7. Para 29: 
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“The evidence had concentrated on the possibility that a particle would have 
got into the pocket as a result of indirect contamination on a number of 
identified occasions on which this might have occurred. The prosecution case 
had been that on each such occasion this was so unlikely that it could be 
discounted.” 
 
8. Para 37: 
 
“The remainder of Mr Keeley's evidence was devoted to consideration of the 
likelihood of secondary contamination. He was taken in detail through each 
occasion on which the defence suggested that there might have been a 
possibility of such contamination and gave his opinion in respect of each 
instance that contamination was ‘most unlikely” 
 
9. Para 38: 
 
“A single particle of FDR had been found in the pocket of the appellant's coat. 
According to the evidence that Mr Keeley gave to us, this was an equally 
unlikely event, whether it had come from the cartridge that killed Miss Dando, 
or from some innocent source. There was even chance that it had resulted from 
innocent contamination.” 
 
10. Para 44: 
 
“I am not going to attempt a statistical probability of this happening by reason 
of innocent contamination. We submit that it is so unlikely that you can safely 
ignore the possibility of innocent contamination.” 
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12. Problem of replacing causal explanations with purely diagnostic 
reasoning 
 
There appears to have been confusion about the entire notion of conditional 
probability that makes the use of the LR irrelevant. Specifically, some of the 
discussion is couched not in terms of a natural causal model (whereby the truth or 
otherwise of a hypothesis leads to certain types of evidence being more or less likely 
to be observed) but rather a purely diagnostic model in which the experts consider 
explicitly which of the alternative hypotheses most naturally explains the observed 
evidence. This difference is summarised in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
(i) Causal view of evidence (ii) Unnatural diagnostic view of 
evidence 
Figure 34 Causal versus diagnostic view of evidence 
 
Specifically, some discussion focuses on whether the evidence E of the discovery of a 
single particle of FDR in the coat is more likely to imply H2p ("Particle found in 
pocket is from gun that killed JD") or not H2p 
 
That the unnatural diagnostic model seems to have been unwittingly used is evident 
from the fact that in this case it make no sense to elicit from experts P(E | H2p) and 
P(E | not H2p)  because in both cases the probabilities are equal to one. Instead we 
have to consider P(H2p | E) and P(not H2p | E). Much of what is contained in the 
transcript indicates that at least some of the experts and lawyers involved were 
assuming that it was P(H2p | E) = P(not H2p | E) = 0.01. If we assume this then it is 
true that the evidence has no probative value on H2p but that does not mean the 
evidence has no probative value on Hp. 
 
 
 
